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Why a stricter regulation of drugs could foster (not deter)
pharmaceutical innovation
Huseyin Naci and Jonathan Cylus provide arguments for how to improve the regulation concerning
pharmaceutical drugs. Since drugs are not assessed relative to alternatives on the market, they claim it
becomes more difficult to accurately evaluate a drug’s successes and harms. Increased innovation and a
more streamlined delivery of information are some of the benefits they attribute to more rigorous drug
regulations.
The way medicines are regulated can be improved. At the
moment, evidence standards f or drugs to gain market
authorization require that each new medicine should be
evaluated on its own merit, without being assessed
against other available treatments. This is the case even
when there are numerous existing alternatives on the
market.
This is problematic. When a new drug comes on the
market, patients, doctors, and health technology
assessment agencies such as the National Institute f or
Health and Clinical Excellence do not have adequate
inf ormation about its benef its and harms relative to
other similar comparators. Second, the current system
crowds the marketplace with products that may be less
ef f ective or more harmf ul than existing agents. In this environment, asking healthcare providers to make
evidence-based decisions is increasingly dif f icult. Lastly, by only requiring manuf acturers to demonstrate
that their products are better than placebos, manuf acturers are incentivised to produce medicines in
therapeutic areas where they have already had successes. This leads to an excess of  similar drugs, and
leaves other therapeutic areas with low investment and high unmet need.
We believe that to gain market approval, pharmaceutical manuf acturers should have to demonstrate that
their products are as good as or better than existing alternatives. Pharmaceutical manuf acturers f avour
the status quo and pref er to test their new products against placebo. They argue that increasing the
evidence standards f or market entry of  new drugs – and testing new drugs against available
comparators – will be detrimental to their business because experimental designs, such as active
comparator trials, are expensive and time consuming. Especially so, they say, in an environment where
innovation is already declining.
However, evidence suggests otherwise. In our recent article published in the BMJ, part of  an occasional
series prepared in conjunction with the European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, we review
the historical trends in pharmaceutical innovation and f ind that the perceived decline in pharmaceutical
innovation is not substantiated. In f act, the number of  medicines entering the market has increased over
the past 65 years. In addition, we f ind no conclusive evidence that past regulation has had a negative
impact on the development of  new medicines. To the contrary, past legislation requiring pharmaceutical
manuf acturers to establish evidence of  ef f ectiveness in controlled trials has been associated with
increased innovation, as measured by the number of  new products entering the market. In light of  this,
we argue that the benef its of  raising evidence standards f or market entry outweigh the potential risks.
Raising evidence standards f or market entry would have numerous benef its. First, patients, doctors, and
health technology assessment agencies would have better inf ormation about new medicines, f acilitating
evidence-based practice of  medicine. As we move towards value-based pricing in the United Kingdom,
payers would have direct evidence early on about the relative benef its and harms of  new medicines and
make more inf ormed value-f or-money decisions f or the National Health Service.
Second, stricter regulations would incentivise the development of  new medicines in therapeutic areas
with f ew or low perf orming alternatives. We expect that requirements f or comparative evidence at the
time of  market approval would send signals to pharmaceutical manuf acturers to f ocus on therapeutic
areas with limited treatment options or where comparators have poor ef f icacy or are f raught with
serious side ef f ects.
Finally, requiring comparative evidence of  new medicines would streamline the inf ormation needs of  all
stakeholders in the regulatory system. Unlike regulatory agencies, health technology assessment
agencies already need manuf acturers to provide comparative evidence to support decisions f or
coverage and reimbursement. In some cases, this discrepancy in evidence requirements results in
conf licting decisions by regulatory agencies and country- level health technology assessment agencies.
One example is the recent decision by the National Institute f or Health and Clinical Excellence in England
and Wales not to recommend bevacizumab, cetuximab, and panitumumab f or the treatment of  colorectal
cancer in the National Health Service. The lack of  comparative data was one of  the cited reasons.
Requiring comparative ef f icacy evidence at the time of  drug market approval will provide payers,
providers, and patients with better inf ormation so that they can make inf ormed decisions. It would also
provide pharmaceutical manuf acturers with the right incentives to invest in innovative drugs. We renew
our call (see BMJ 2011) f or the European Medicines Agency to give comparative ef f icacy evidence a
f ormal role in drug approvals.
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